

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

TELEFAX 19

## INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Korea/China/USSR

DATE DISTR 8 JUN 51

SUBJECT Chinese and Soviet Agreements Regarding Korea

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE  
ACQUIREDNO. OF ENCLS.  
(LISTED BELOW)DATE OF  
INFO.SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

25X1

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE  
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50  
U.S.C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION  
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRO-  
HIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

25X1

1. between KIM Il-song, Soviet General Shtykov, and ISI Ken-ma (phonetic)\*, acting Chinese Communist ambassador to North Korea, at the residence of KIM Il-song in Yongak-san (125-37, 39-02). To alleviate KIM's apprehension over possible United Nations landings in the rear of North Korean troops then on the Pusan perimeter, Shtykov and ISI promised KIM that in case the war situation became unfavorable the Chinese Communist and Soviet armies would aid the North Koreans.
2. When LI Li-san, Chinese Communist delegate to the Far East Cominform visited Pyongyang and Seoul in mid-August,\*\* he reached an understanding with KIM Il-song that the Chinese Communists would furnish aid (of unspecified type) to North Korea.
3. In mid-September 1950, General Shtykov and the principal Soviet adviser, who had aided the North Hamgyong government\*\*\* and served as chairman of the Democratic Youth Association of the USSR, went to Moscow for a month. About the time of their return in mid-October, the International Cominform decided to send the Chinese Communist and Soviet armies to aid the North Koreans.
4. According to a member of the North Korean State Security Bureau, a Soviet-Chinese agreement and the decision of the Cominform settled that the Chinese Communists were to occupy the area west of a line from South Hamgyong Province to Chunggangjin (126-53, 41-47) and the Soviets were to defend North Hamgyong. Pursuant to this arrangement, an unidentified Soviet force entered the Majindong (130-19, 42-13) and Chongjin (129-49, 41-47) areas at an undetermined date before the end of 1950.
5. In connection with this movement, in late 1950, the North Korean State Security Bureau sent YI Tok-yong (李德龍) to the Majindong area on a program to tighten security measures. YI, a full colonel, in distinction from other State Security Bureau section chiefs, who are lieutenant colonels, is considered one

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

25X1

## CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB	<input type="checkbox"/>
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI	<input type="checkbox"/>

This document is hereby regraded to  
CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the  
letter of 16 October 1978 from the  
Director of Central Intelligence to the  
Archivist of the United States.

Next Review Date: 2008

Document

No Change

Declassify

Class. Change

Auth.: BR 70-2

Date: 24 JUL 1978

25X1

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1

-2-

of the ablest State Security agents. For security reasons, the North Korean government dismissed the chairman of the North Korean Labor Party for North and South Hamgyong and appointed PAK Yong, a Soviet-Korean dispatched by the Soviet Communist Party for the purpose, both chairman of the two labor parties and military governor of North Hamgyong.

6. Both at the time of the invasion of South Korea and when the government evacuated Pyongyang, the North Korean officials were not certain that the Chinese Communists would dispatch military aid. Their uncertainty is evidenced by the North Korean plan to evacuate government departments and army headquarters to various areas of Manchuria and by the fact that the evacuation was suddenly halted at Huichon (126-10, 40-10) and officials sent into Manchuria were recalled in late October when Chinese Communist units had entered in Korea.
7. In early January 1951, North Korean officials and high-ranking Chinese Communist officers stated the following:
  - a. The objective of the Chinese Communist entry into the Korean war was not primarily to save the North Korean regime but was part of the over-all Communist plan for communization of the world. The current stage of this plan is world revolution to destroy imperialistic capitalism, of which the United States is the main bulwark.
  - b. The present problem, therefore, is not that of China, Korea, or any single nation, but the struggle between two opposing groups, in North Korea and the world. China, like other "people's democracies," is fighting to destroy the United States and its satellites. The leaders of both China and Korea are willing to destroy their own nations in order to wage a war of attrition against the capacity of the "capitalistic democracies," and for this purpose they are satisfied to sacrifice ten men for one United Nations soldier or tank.
  - c. Chinese Communist strategy is therefore directed toward this end rather than toward occupation of specific areas. As long as opposing forces remain, Chinese Communist troops will stay in Korea.

\*   Comment. The Chinese Communist ambassador to North Korea was reported to be LI Shih-liang;  

25X1

\*\*   Comment. LI Li-san and KUO Mo-jo were heads of a Chinese Communist group which visited Korea in late summer 1950 to encourage the Korean Communists in their program.

25X1

\*\*\*   Comment. According to the XXIV Corps Soviet Personalities in Korea, Colonel Ryazanov was military commandant of North Hamgyong, appointed in February 1947. Whether it is Ryazanov who is here referred to, or some other adviser is not known.

~~SECRET~~